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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes respon-
sible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criti-
cism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and eviden-
tial considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour 
is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential 
considerations, I contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational struc-
ture of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the 
structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue 
in favour of an associationist view.
Keywords: implicit attitudes, associationism, logical sensitivity, social structures.
RESUMEN: En este artículo cuestiono la tesis de que la estructura representacional de las actitudes implícitas responsa-
bles del comportamiento implícitamente sesgado es proposicional—en lugar de asociacionista. De acuerdo con 
la propuesta criticada, si la conducta implícita sesgada puede ocasionalmente ser modulada por consideraciones 
lógicas y evidenciales, entonces la estructura de las actitudes implícitas responsables de esa conducta es proposi-
cional. Cuestiono, en particular, la verdad de este condicional. Sostengo que la sensibilidad de las actitudes im-
plícitas a consideraciones lógicas y evidenciales resulta ser un criterio inadecuado para establecer su verdadera 
estructura representacional. Consideraciones de otro tipo, que enfatizan los desafíos planteados por la injusticia 
social estructural que las actitudes implícitas reflejan, ofrecen, concluyo, un mejor apoyo para decidir esta cues-
tión a favor de una visión asociacionista.
Palabras clave: actitudes implícitas, asociacionismo, sensibilidad lógica, estructuras sociales.
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Introduction
Most of us, despite sincerely and justifiably considering ourselves to be unprejudiced agents, 
consciously committed to egalitarianism in all its forms, are often surprised to discover that 
we harbour implicit attitudes that betray our unprejudiced, egalitarian explicit beliefs. Such 
implicit attitudes reflect constant exposure to stereotypical portrayals of members of, and 
items in, all kinds of different categories: racial groups, professions, women, nationalities, 
members of the LGBTQ community, moral and political values, etc. We may thus very 
well find that we are better and faster categorizers when e.g. female names are paired with 
family-oriented tasks or when negative words are paired with pictures of black faces even if 
we disavow sexism and racism—and even when we ourselves are female or black.
The expression ‘implicit bias’ is sometimes used to refer, not to the mental states re-
sponsible for certain behavioural outputs, but to the behavioural outputs themselves. Of-
ten, however, the expressions ‘implicit attitude’, ‘implicit bias’ and ‘stereotype’ are taken to 
be synonyms, and are used to refer to the mental states responsible for implicitly biased be-
haviour. I here follow this trend. Throughout the paper, my focus is on the mental states 
responsible for implicitly biased, often discriminatory, behaviour.
According to what I would like to call ‘the Associationist View’, implicit attitudes are 
associations, i.e., mental states typically connecting one or two concepts and a valence (usu-
ally negative) or two or more concepts, one of which (again usually, but not always) has a 
negative slant. The claim that implicit attitudes are associations is consistent with the idea 
that they are e.g. images or mental maps, but the main contrast to be drawn here is between 
associations and propositionally structured mental states. In particular, the claim conveys 
the idea that implicit attitudes are different from beliefs, despite their similarities and de-
spite the fact that we can express many, if not all, our implicit attitudes in linguistic form. 
The Associationist View is particularly prominent among social psychologists.12Stressing 
the fact that these associations are mostly unconscious, here is an illustration: ‘Implicit at-
titudes [stereotypes] are social category associations that become activated without the 
perceiver’s intention or awareness when he or she is presented with a category cue’ (Blair 
et al. 2001, 828). The Associationist View is also popular in philosophy. Jules Holroyd, a 
well-known scholar on this matter, for instance, writes (Holroyd 2012, 275): ‘An individ-
ual harbours an implicit bias against some stigmatised group (G), when she has automatic 
cognitive or affective associations between (her concept of) G and some negative property 
(P) or stereotypic trait (T).’ Philosophers who endorse what Brownstein (2016a) calls a Sui 
Generis Model of implicit attitudes (Gendler, 2008a,b 2011; Brownstein & Madva 2012; 
Madva 2012, 2016) are committed in one way or another to the Associationist View.
The mental structure of associations is taken to be that of a network formed on the ba-
sis of the mutual causal activations of the concepts and valences involved. The main char-
acteristic of such networks is that the relation between associated nodes is not predication. 
Nodes in the network do not decompose into a truth-evaluable propositional structure. 
Associations are instead the result of reliable, reinforcing connections, as they are typically 
learnt by exposure. For instance, on the Associationist View, the widespread—albeit of-
1 The standard usage of ‘attitude’ in this context is thus different to the standard usage of ‘attitude’ in 
philosophy, where attitudes are taken to be relations to propositions. 
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ten implicit—attitude that we normally express with the sentence “women are caring” is 
taken to consist of an associative structure where the concepts WOMAN and CARING 
are mutually activated due to our being constantly exposed to images of women in nurtur-
ing roles, as opposed to e.g. leadership ones.2 On the Associationist View, conditioning and 
reinforcement are taken to be the two standard ways of forming associations. The strength 
of this type of associations between concepts or concepts and valences depends on the fre-
quency and strength of the exposure.
The cognitive dynamics of associations is also different to that of propositionally struc-
tured representations. It is a process of spreading activation in a network formed on the ba-
sis of spatiotemporal contiguity. The transitions that fall under the category of thinking are 
not governed by syntactic rules, but by proximity and strength of connection. A typical as-
sociative transition can occur between any two (or more) representations regardless of their 
content. For instance, I can associate bunny rabbits and Easter just in virtue of having often 
experienced these items/events together. A typical inferential transition between proposi-
tions, by contrast, rely on the content and formal structure of the representations involved, 
as in e.g. a modus ponens transition from if p then q and p, to q. Dual-system theories (see 
e.g. Sloman1996; Kahneman 2011 or Evans and Stanovich 2013) reflect this dichotomy, as 
their basic tenet is the postulation of two very different types of cognitive processes—two 
very different reasoning systems. According to these theories, system 1, also called ‘the asso-
ciative system’ is fast, intuitive, automatic and, of course, associative; it requires little cogni-
tive capacity and is independent of endorsed truth-values. System 2 or ‘the rule-based sys-
tem’ operates on propositionally structured mental representations through symbolic rules; 
it is slow, reflective and sequential; it often requires a large amount of cognitive capacity 
and it is sensitive to truth-values.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald et al. 1998) and sequential priming, 
together with other tests,3, have become classic tools for unmasking the degree to which 
we are subject to the tyranny of stereotypes and are widely used in Social Psychology, even 
though the relevance of response latencies as a good measure of implicit attitudes is not 
without criticism. Some theorists do question the interpretation of the scores from tests 
such as the IAT (see e.g. Karpinski & Hilton 2001; Olson & Fazio 2004; Rothermund & 
Wentura 2004), but the debate is still going on and responses to the criticisms are certainly 
widespread (see e.g., Banaji 2001; Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji & Klauer 2005).4 The general 
2 Of course, there are also non-associative explanations of how WOMAN and CARING can be related. 
One could straightforwardly hold the connection to be propositional. Alternatively one could think of 
CARING as a prototypical feature of the concept WOMAN, as typically posited by a prototype the-
ory of concepts. The example here is meant to illustrate just the type of structure that, according to the 
Associationist View, explains this common automatic activation.
3 E.g., the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) (Payne et al. 2005) or the Go/No-go Association 
Task (GNAT) (Nosek & Banaji 2001).
4 See, in particular, the recent controversy over the meta-analysis of studies that link subjects’ IAT scores 
and their actual discriminatory behaviour. Greenwald, Poehlman, Ulmann and Banaji (2009) argue 
for a strong link between these two variables. Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard and Tetlock (2013) 
question the link and focus on the influence of overt biases in the participants. Greenwald, Banaji and 
Nosek (2015) quickly replied to the Oswald et al. meta-analysis. Additional studies since then keep 
feeding the debate. 
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consensus in social psychology is that standard indirect methods are reliable means of get-
ting information about a phenomenon characterized by its opacity to introspection and its 
frequent clash with our explicit beliefs.
Indeed, what is most characteristic of implicit attitudes is that they permeate our per-
ception, actions and decision in an unconscious manner. They are seldom the objects of 
awareness or easily accessible through introspection, which makes them especially resilient 
to change—resilient, but not unchangeable. Implicit attitudes can be modulated. Accord-
ing to a long-standing view in social psychology, extinction and counterconditioning are 
the two major sources of change, since we acquire implicit attitudes mainly through con-
ditioning and reinforcement. Some recent studies, however, seem to suggest that implicit 
attitudes can also be changed through evidential and rational considerations (Gawronski 
et al. 2005; Sechrist and Stangor 2001). These empirical results have recently been used to 
argue against the Associationist View and in favour of what Michael Brownstein (2016a) 
calls the Doxastic Model of implicit attitudes (Mandelbaum 2016). According to the 
Doxastic model, implicit attitudes are propositional states, i.e., either beliefs (De Hou-
wer 2014; Egan 2011; Hughes et al. 2011; Mandelbaum 2013, 2016; Mitchell et al. 2009; 
Smith 2005, 2012) or states that fall short of being beliefs, but are, nevertheless, proposi-
tionally structured (Levy 2014).
The modulation of implicit attitudes as a way of assessing their representational struc-
ture is the focus of this paper. In particular, my aim is to discuss the conditional that moves 
from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and 
evidential considerations to the view that the structure of implicit attitudes is propositional 
(Mandelbaum 2016). Mandelbaum’s defence of this conditional is an inference to the best 
explanation. I argue, by contrast, that the Associationist View can give a satisfactory account 
of this type of modulation and is to be preferred to Doxastic Model. My argument, however, 
remains neutral with regard to the truth of the converse of Mandelbaum’s endorsed condi-
tional: if implicit attitudes are insensitive to logical and evidential considerations, then they 
are associations. Most research in social psychology, especially the work of Gawronski and 
collaborators, is driven by this second hypothesis. In philosophy, Madva (2016), although 
sidestepping the issue of the real representational structure of implicit attitudes, argues for 
their insensitivity to logical form, thus making them different from beliefs. My focus, I in-
sist, is just on the considerations that make the move from logical sensitivity to propositional 
structure appear plausible—not the other way around. The positive part of my argument 
moves away from issues about logical sensitivity to focus instead on methodological issues 
about what makes implicit attitudes the distinctive mental states that they are and how to 
best characterize them given such distinctive features. The idea, in a nutshell, is the follow-
ing. Even if implicit attitudes can sometimes be modulated by evidential and rational con-
siderations, this is not their most distinctive characteristic, and any inquiry into their nature 
that emphasizes this aspect will be off-target as far as best explanations go.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I offer some counterexamples to the 
general idea that the rational and evidential sensitivity of mental states—any type of mental 
state—is best explained by their having a propositional structure. I acknowledge that the 
counterexamples I offer do not constitute a knock down argument. The dialectic here is to 
cast doubt on the truth of the general conditional on which Mandelbaum’s more specific 
one seems to depend. I then put forward, in Section 2, a more specific argument that tar-
gets directly Mandelbaum’s (2016) analysis of the evidence he takes to be conclusive against 
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the Associationist View. I there question the inference Mandelbaum makes from behaviour 
modulation to attitudes’ representational properties. Cases of modulation of implicitly bi-
ased behaviour through rational and evidential sensitivity, I argue, do not settle the issue of 
the propositional representational format of the implicit attitudes themselves. In Section 3, 
more positively, I argue that the Associationist View remains the loveliest explanation, in 
Lipton’s (2004) sense, of the phenomenon of implicit attitudes, i.e., it provides the best un-
derstanding of their central characteristics. To highlight such characteristics, we have to 
move back to the social arena where pervasive structural social injustice tunes and fosters 
our minds.
1. Modulation of (other) mental states
As a first step in a strategy to defend the Doxastic Model of implicit attitudes, Mandel-
baum (2016) sets to prove the truth of the following conditional: if implicit attitudes can 
be modified through rational argumentation (or any evidential considerations that involve 
sensitivity to logical structure), then, they are not associations; they are propositionally 
structured mental states. The final step of the positive proposal takes implicit attitudes to 
be just plain beliefs.
Mandelbaum offers abundant evidence that seems to support the claim that implic-
itly biased behaviour can indeed be sensitive to rational and evidential considerations. I 
will discuss some of these experimental results below. In this Section, I make a prelimi-
nary move and cast doubt on the plausibility of the general version of the conditional on 
which Mandelbaum’s specific conditional seems to depend, i.e., I question the view that, 
for any type of mental state, sensitivity to logical and/or evidential considerations set-
tles the issue of their representational structure being propositional. I will follow Man-
delbaum in taking the conditional as an expression of an inference to the best explana-
tion. So, what I aim to show in this Section is that, in general, for any type of mental 
state, their sensitivity to logical and/or evidential considerations is not necessarily best 
explained by assuming that they are propositions. I focus on two types of mental states: 
pain and disgust.5
The mental state we call ‘pain’ is typically considered to be a sensation, with no content 
and, a fortiori, no representational structure. Yet, the experience of pain can be modulated 
through evidential and rational considerations. Placebo and nocebo studies clearly show 
this. There is ample evidence of top-down modulatory circuits that strongly change the ex-
perience of pain to the point of completely eradicating its typical phenomenology. Patients 
who are told that they will receive an analgesic while undergoing e.g. the removal of a mo-
lar report to feel less pain after they are given a placebo injection. This phenomenon, called 
“placebo analgesia”, has been demonstrated to work in roughly one third of the subjects in-
volved in the relevant studies (see e.g. Beecher 1955). Similarly, telling patients that they 
5 It could be argued that, even if sensitivity to rational considerations is not a decisive criterion for estab-
lishing, in general, the representational format of mental states, it is decisive for establishing the repre-
sentational format of implicit attitudes. But then, those who endorse this view owe us an explanation 
of what makes implicit attitudes so special and the answer cannot be that implicit attitudes are just at-
titudes, i.e., states with a propositional format, on pain of circularity. 
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will receive a drug that would increase their pain —a hyperalgesic drug— has also a top-
down effect on the affective phenomenology of the experience, resulting in much higher 
pain scores (Ossipov et al. 2010, 3780).
It could, of course, be argued that philosophical theories of pain vary substantially and 
that the placebo and nocebo cases can be treated as counterexamples to the general condi-
tional under review just in case pain could be uncontroversially recognized a sensation with 
no content. There are, after all, some representational accounts of pain and, on some of 
these accounts, the feeling of pain is understood as the representation of some sort of tissue 
damage.6 My point, however, is not to offer a knock down argument, but to help under-
mine the connection between rational sensitivity and propositional structure with regard 
to a mental state, pain, which seems, at least prima facie, a bad candidate for having such a 
representational format, given its sensory nature. Even representational theories of pain, 
when the issue is how to best explain the modulation of pain illustrated by the placebo and 
nocebo cases, offer a different kind of explanation. Pain modulation is often accounted for 
by appealing to the cognitive penetrability of experience, i.e., the idea that verbal informa-
tion about the composition of the drug has a causal effect on the phenomenology of the 
pain experience itself. Again, we may question the general plausibility of the cognitive pen-
etrability thesis (see e.g. Firestone & Scholl 2016), and even if we do not, we still need to 
say a lot more about how cognitive penetration works. Nevertheless, my point remains: to 
account for the modulation of pain by verbal information by positing a propositional rep-
resentational format does not seem to capture what is most characteristic of this mental 
state: its phenomenology.
Consider now one of our basic emotions: disgust. Studies on disgust as a food-related 
emotion show that the valence of olfactive experiences involving this emotion can be mod-
ulated by giving the subject information about the source of the food-odour. For example, 
if someone who likes cheese is asked to sniff the odour coming out of an opaque vial after 
being told that it contains cheese, she likes the odour. But she does not like it if she is told 
that the vial contains faeces, even if the odours are exactly the same (Rozin 1987, 24). Pro-
viding “evidence” about the source of a particular odour hence changes the affective phe-
nomenology of the experience.
Pre-theoretically, we tend to think of basic emotions as feelings, as mental states with 
no content and hence no representational structure. If we endorsed this view, the above 
studies on disgust would be a clear counterexample to the general conditional under discus-
sion, i.e., to the idea that modulation by evidential sensitivity entails propositional struc-
ture. However, as in the case of pain, philosophical accounts of emotions come in different 
varieties, some of which, so-called cognitivist theories, characterize emotions as judgments 
(Nussbaum 2001), as sets of beliefs and desires (Marks 1982) or as mixed states whose com-
ponents are beliefs, desires, and feelings (Oakley 1992).7 But, again, to endorse a proposi-
tional view of emotions based on their sensitivity to evidential considerations, as e.g. Man-
delbaum (2013) does, seems to be methodologically dubious: it amounts to focusing on the 
6 See e.g. Martínez (2011) for the view that pain has imperative content or Bain (2013) for the view that 
pain has indicative content with an evaluative component.
7 See also Mandelbaum (2013) for an analysis of these experimental results that invites viewing disgust 
as a propositionally structured emotion. 
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opposite of what is most characteristic about them: their resilience to be modulated by ra-
tional or evidential considerations.
The take home message is thus the following. The general link between sensitivity to 
rational and evidential considerations and propositional structure is, at least, questiona-
ble, especially for mental states whose most salient characteristic is precisely their resilience 
to change, as in the case of pain and emotions. For the most part, the representational ac-
counts on the market of these types of mental states are motivated by considerations of a 
different kind—considerations that are neutral with respect to the representational format 
of the states.
In the next Section, I adopt a different approach. Instead of questioning the general 
strategy behind Mandelbaum’s target conditional, I focus instead on the specific evidence 
that allegedly connects implicit attitudes’ evidential sensitivity to propositional structure.
2. Rational sensitivity: the evidence and what follows from it
Let us summarize Mandelbaum’s argument. The thesis he tries to refute is:
T: The implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour are mental 
states with an associative structure.
And this is how Madelbaum tries to falsify it.
P1: If the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour are men-
tal states with an associative structure, then implicitly biased behaviour can be 
changed or eliminated only by altering certain environmental contingencies, i.e., 
either by extinction or counterconditioning.
P2: Logical and evidential factors change or eliminate implicitly biased behaviour.
C1: The implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour are not mental 
states with an associative structure.
C2: The implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour are just beliefs.
In what follows I’ll try to show that we do not need to accept C1 because P1 is false—i.e., 
although the argument is valid, it is not sound. Even if implicitly biased behaviour can be 
changed by factors other than extinction or counterconditioning, such as logical and evi-
dential factors, we should not accept, for this reason, a propositional view of implicit atti-
tudes. I will not offer an argument against C2 and simply assume (pace Levy 2014) that the 
transition from C1 to C2 is unproblematic, were C1 true.
Even though I have re-rewritten Mandelbaum’s argument as a valid modus ponens argu-
ment, we should not forget that the real form of the argument is that of an inference to the 
best explanation, i.e., the claim Mandelbaum defends is that the apparent rational sensitiv-
ity of implicitly biased behaviour observed in some experimental set-ups is best explained 
by implicitly attitudes being propositionally structured. What thus needs to be shown is 
not just that the data could also be explained within an associationist framework, but also 
that this framework is, on the whole, a better explanation of implicit biases’ distinctive 
properties than Mandelbaum’s Doxastic account. My aim in the rest of the paper is hence 
two-fold. First, in this Section, I discuss two of the experiments Mandelbaum takes to be 
decisive to support the truth of P1 so as to isolate an unwarranted step in their interpre-
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tation. I also suggest an alternative explanation for the apparent rational sensitivity of im-
plicit attitudes that remains faithful to general associative principles. Second, in the next 
and final Section, I motivate why the Associationist view of implicit attitudes may still be 
the best explanation of their central features.
Before engaging with the first of the two tasks just mentioned, I would like to briefly 
discuss two other studies, which Mandelbaum does not consider. The reason for bring-
ing them here is to offer a mixed view of P2, but also to introduce an element of caution 
when interpreting the experimental results surrounding implicit biases modulation. In 
the first, Kawakami and collaborators (2000) examine the effect of training in negating 
stereotypical associations related to skinheads and race on future behaviour. They show 
that repeatedly negating stereotype-congruent pairs of traits (by pressing a button labelled 
“NO” when exposed to stereotypical pairings, such as skinhead-hostile) and affirming ster-
eotype-incongruent pairs of traits (by pressing a button labelled “YES” when exposed to 
counter-stereotypical pairings, such as skinhead-friendly) can later modify the influence 
of these stereotypes on a person categorization task, even for stereotypical traits that are 
not involved in the training. These results do initially support the plausibility of P2, given 
the essential role of negation in the training. However, even here we have to be careful. 
Kawakami et al. (2000) also conjecture that affirmation of counter-stereotypes may have an 
influence on the weakening of the initial associations, since they did not find that non-ster-
eotypical traits were more often associated with the relevant categories after the training.
In a follow-up study, Gawronski and collaborators (2008) questioned precisely the 
idea that just negating stereotypical traits could be the relevant explanatory factor involved 
in the observed change of stereotype activation. In this study, the two tasks were separated, 
i.e., subjects either received training in negation of racial stereotypes or affirmation of non-
stereotypical racial associations, but not both. Their results show that while there is a re-
duction in the activation of stereotypes after non-stereotypical affirmation training, when 
the training consists just in the negation of stereotypical-congruent racial traits, it has the 
opposite effect, i.e., it enhances instead of reducing the influence of stereotypes in subse-
quent person categorization and evaluation tasks. These remarkable results seem to suggest 
that simply being exposed to stereotype-congruent traits, even when the training consists 
in negating the association, may be enough to reinforce previously held implicit attitudes.8 
They also seem to confirm Kawakami et al.’s (2000) conjecture that the countercondition-
ing involved in the counter-stereotype pairing part of their study might have played an im-
portant role in the later reduction of stereotype association.
If Gawronski et al. (2008) are right, the truth of P2 would seem to shatter. At a min-
imum, as it often happens in social psychology, evidence is mixed. Interestingly, however, 
and moving now to the issue that concerns me here, even Kawakami et al. (2000) do not 
conclude from their findings that implicit attitudes have propositional structure. In fact, 
when addressing the issue of the processes responsible for the stereotype reduction ac-
tivation found in their study, they offer three options, all of which remain faithful to a 
characterization of implicit attitudes as associations: (i) strengthening and weakening of 
category-trait associations; (ii) higher motivation to stop their previous associations and 
8 See Madva (2016) for an argument in favour of the insensitivity of implicit attitudes to the logical 
form of thoughts and information based on this kind of results. 
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 41-60
 Implicit Bias: From Social Structure to Representational Format 49
(iii) a combination of the two (Kawakami et al. 2000, 884). Less surprisingly, Gawron-
ski et al. (2008) also take their results to reinforce the associative nature of implicit atti-
tudes. The best explanation of this reinforcement of implicit attitudes, even after train-
ing with negation of stereotype-congruent pairings, they claim, is that implicit attitudes 
are associations.
If we were to formulate Gawronski’s view in terms of a conditional, however, it would 
be the converse of P1: if implicit attitudes are not sensitive to logical and evidential consid-
erations, then they are associations. Needless to say, a conditional may be true while its con-
verse is false. So, I do not take these results to be directly in conflict with Mandelbaum’s ap-
proach. As I said, the purpose of this part of the discussion is to raise a cautious voice about 
the interpretation of experimental results involving changes in implicit biases. In what fol-
lows, I will discuss two other studies, which Mandelbaum does review in his (2016) paper. 
I aim to show that the evidence they provide does not conclusively establish that the repre-
sentational format of implicit attitudes is propositional.
The first of the two studies I have selected (Gawronski et al. 2005) involves the meas-
urement of both implicit and explicit attitudes vis-à-vis Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider 
1958). According to Cognitive Balance Theory (CB henceforth) to maintain psychological 
stability, we form relationships that balance our attitudes, toward people, events, activities 
or ideas.9 The classic example to illustrate CB’s predictions is the formation of interper-
sonal relationships, the idea, for instance, that if A dislikes B and is told that B dislikes C, 
A would end up liking C. The mental transitions involved in adjusting our attitudes in this 
way seem to have an inferential character. According to Mandelbaum, if such transitions 
are inferential, then they operate on propositional structure. With that in mind, Mandel-
baum (2016, 638) argues for a (contrapositive) version of P1:
… if we can find support for something like Balance Theory among implicit attitudes, we can be 
reasonably sure that implicit attitudes aren’t partaking in an associative process but instead have 
some sort of logic operating over them.
Gawronski at al. (2005) do indeed look into the effects of CB on the formation and change 
of both implicit and explicit interpersonal attitudes. They do it by reproducing an office 
environment and examining the way in which participants form attitudes about the people 
in it. They first present participants with photos of their just acquired colleagues, i.e., un-
familiar individuals (CS1s), while pairing the photos with consistently positive or consist-
ently negative statements. The target is to make participants form positive or negative atti-
tudes toward these CS1s. Once these relationships have been established, in a second part 
of the experiment, participants are introduced to another set of people photographs. This 
time, however, the only information they have about these different unfamiliar individu-
als (CS2) is whether they are liked or disliked by the previous CS1s. After this second step, 
participants are, finally, given an affective priming task to evaluate their implicit attitudes 
toward both CS1s and CS2s.
9 Similar principles run the work done in Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger 1957), according to 
which we have an inner drive to hold all our attitudes and beliefs in harmony and avoid disharmony or dis-
sonance among them. Both theories aim to give an account of the idea that we seek to eliminate inconsist-
ent beliefs and attitudes and we do that by, sometimes, engaging in irrational or maladaptive behaviour.
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As it was to be expected, if participant S formed a positive implicit attitude toward 
CS1 A, and CS1 A liked CS2 B, then S also reacted positively toward B. Gawronski and 
collaborators also found that if e.g., participant S formed a negative attitude toward CS1 A 
and A disliked CS2 B, then S reacted positively toward B—although this type of balanced 
triads were not obtained in a parallel but inversed order case, i.e., when S was first told, be-
fore getting any negative information about A, that A disliked B. Here is Mandelbaum’s 
(2016, 639) interpretation of the results:
[The hypothesis that implicitly biased behaviour is caused by some sort of associative proc-
ess or structure] predicts that you should have enhanced negative reactions toward the CS2 be-
cause you a) are encountering the CS2 as yoked to negatively valenced CS1 and b) are activating 
another negative valence because you are told that the CS1 dislikes the CS2. I have no opinion on 
whether two wrongs make a right, but I’m confident that if you find two negatives making a posi-
tive, what you’ve found is a propositional, and not an associative, process.
The structure of the argument is as follows: If CS1 is associated with a negative valence and 
becomes associated with CS2, which also has a negative valence (associated with the word 
“dislike”), then the additional negative valence should increase the negative valence associ-
ate with CS2. If the propositional information that CS1 dislikes CS2 yields, in accordance 
with CB, a positive reaction toward CS2 despite the summing of negative valences, then 
such a transition seems to operate over propositionally structured mental states.
How plausible is this interpretation of the results? Let’s grant, for the sake of the argu-
ment, that acquiring information about (a disliked) CS1’s dislike for CS2 leads to a positive 
response toward CS2s. After all, I am not questioning P2 in Mandelbaum’s argument.10 Ac-
cording to P2, logical and evidential factors can change or eliminate implicitly biased behav-
iour. Yet, the inference from the fact that evidential factors can have an effect on implicitly 
biased behaviour to the claim that the structure of the attitudes themselves is propositional 
would work only if implicitly biased behaviour was just the result of implicit attitudes—that 
no other associative or non-associative factors were involved in our implicitly biased behav-
ioural outputs. Yet, no one in social psychology would deny that all sort of factors—associ-
ative, non-associative and even non-attitudinal processes11—have to be taken into account 
when offering explanations of implicit attitudes’ modulation (see e.g. Calanchini & Sher-
man 2013 and my discussion of the Quadruple Process Model below). It is perfectly consist-
ent to maintain that implicit attitudes are associations and that factors other than counter-
conditioning and extinction can modulate implicitly biased behaviour. So P1 is false.
My point, just to be clear, is this: since changes in implicitly biased behaviour are caused 
by all sort of factors, not just implicit attitudes, moving from (certain types of) changes in 
biased behaviour to specific properties of the attitudes themselves—without taking into ac-
count the role of the other factors involved in the production of biased behaviour—makes 
the propositional hypothesis loose plausibility.
10 Even if evidence is less than conclusive here. In a previous study, Gawronski and Strack (2004) pro-
vided evidence in support of the idea that CB did not affect implicit attitudes.
11 Non-attitudinal processes are (either associative or non-associative) processes that affect implicit task 
performance without affecting specifically the content of the attitude. They are “domain-general proc-
esses unrelated to specific attitude content” (Calanchini & Sherman 2013, 661).
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There is plenty of evidence now about the poor correlation of IAT scores with other 
measures of implicit bias, including affective priming, with changes in real world biased be-
haviour. A non-negligible number of recent meta-analysis studies have made it clear that 
classic experimental measures of implicit biases are not reliably tracking individual’s im-
plicit attitudes or dispositions to biased behaviour due to fundamental methodological mis-
takes, such as a worryingly low test-retest reliability. Test-retest reliability (r) for any psy-
chometric instrument ranges between 0 and 1. A value of r = 1 indicates that the test gives 
the same result when repeated at different time intervals. r is usually considered acceptable 
for a psychometric test when its value is 0.8. For the IAT, however, some studies (see e.g. 
Bar-Anan & Nosek 2014) report a test-retest reliability as low as r = 0.4.12 The suspicion 
is that this methodological oddity is due precisely to the multiplicity of factors responsible 
for biased behaviour. And if this is the case, then poor correlation of IAT scores with other 
measures of implicit bias could be used to undermine the inference from changes in biased 
behaviour to changes in the attitudes themselves—changes used, in turn, to settle the issue 
of their representational format.
More important for my purposes here are the results of a recent meta-analysis focused 
on modulation of implicit attitudes, and not just predictability of implicitly biased behav-
iour. Forscher et al. (2016) run a thorough discussion of different experimental results 
involving all kinds of psychometric measures and plausibly question the idea that appar-
ent changes of implicit biases in experimental set-ups give us reliable information about 
changes in real world implicitly biased behaviour. The general idea behind this work, and 
the reason I bring it up in connection with Mandelbaum’s interpretation of Gawronski 
et al. (2005)’s experiments is that, even if we accept that certain procedures, e.g., verbal in-
formation, do in fact change implicit biased behaviour in certain experimental conditions, 
there is very little evidence showing that these changes replicate themselves in the world 
outside the lab. So, even if we accepted that experiments like the one above show changes 
in implicit attitudes, there may be little reason to think that such changes are replicable in 
the real world—and again, this may very well due to the multiplicity of factors involved in 
biased behavioural modulation. So, we should be cautious about taking these experimental 
results as the definite proof for endorsing a hypothesis about the propositional representa-
tional structure of the implicit attitudes. Indeed, evidence and rational considerations have 
generally proved to be poor instruments of change. As I will argue in the last Section, the 
main reason is that implicit attitudes are a reflection of unjust structures in our social envi-
ronment and it seems unlikely that real changes can occur without changing first such so-
cial structures (pace Brownstein 2016b).13
12 See also e.g. Carlsson and Agerström (2016). Unlike the debate between Oswald et al. (2013) and Green-
wald et al. (2015), which focuses on the predictive power of psychometric instruments like the IAT with 
regard to predicted biased behaviour or on general methodological issues, Carlsson & Agerström focus on 
the behaviour itself, in particular, on disparate treatment (or discrimination) based on race.
13 To be accurate, Brownstein does not completely deny this point. Instead, he points out some of the 
limitations of what he calls the “world-first strategy” and the “situationist”, outwardly-focused ethics, 
i.e., the idea that to change implicit attitudes one has to change the world first or to seek/avoid situa-
tions which would potentially make us more biased. He argues in favour of three types of self-regula-
tory strategies based on the special relationships between social context (a term of art in his work) and 
implicit attitudes. 
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Here is the second experiment I would like to discuss from the evidence presented in 
Mandelbaum (2016). Sechrist and Stangor (2001) recruited 54 (26 male and 28 female) 
white undergraduate psychology students from the University of Maryland and divided 
them in two groups according to their high- or low-prejudice attitudes toward African 
American based on a preliminary testing session using the Pro-Black Scale (Katz & Hass 
1988). The participants were told that the task was to assess people’s views about different 
social groups. To this end, they were given the same Pro-Black Scale test again, i.e., a ques-
tionnaire with nine favourable and nine unfavourable stereotypical traits associated with 
African American. They were asked to rate their perception of the percentage of African 
Americans with those traits. Participants were also given feedback about other University 
of Maryland students’ opinion on these matters. This information took the form of the 
average percentage of peers who agreed with the answers provided by the students in the 
experiment. This percentage was calculated by comparing their own responses with their 
peers’ responses. Randomly after completing the questionnaire, each participant received 
one of two different types of feedback: half of the participants in both the high- and low-
biased groups was told that 81% of the University of Maryland students agreed with them 
and the other half was told that only 19% of the students in their university agreed with 
them.
The way Sechrist and Stangor measure the participants’ implicit attitudes toward Af-
rican American was to confabulate some excuse to ask them to leave the room where the 
experiment took place and sit in a different room with seven chairs. An African Ameri-
can confederate was already sat in the seat closest to the door of that room. Implicit at-
titudes were measured in terms of how close or further away from the confederate the 
participant sat—a standard test for measuring racial attitudes. Participants who were 
highly biased against African Americans according to the initial test, after learning that 
their peers disagreed with them, sat closer to the African American than those in the 
same group who were informed that their peers agreed with them. Although the results 
were less significant in the case of participants who were low-biased, these students also 
sat closer to the African American confederate after learning that their peers agreed with 
them. If the feedback was that the majority of their peers disagree with them, they sat 
further away.
Mandelbaum presents these results as, again, a case in favour of a propositional view of 
the representational structure of implicit attitudes since students changed their implicitly 
biased behaviour as a result of evidence, in the form of the students’ peers’ opinion, and, if 
this occurs, according to Mandelbaum, then (the best explanation is that) their implicit at-
titudes have a propositional structure (the contrapositive of P1). Here is the relevant part 
of his analysis (Mandelbaum 2016, 642):
[O]n a purely associative story, … the high-prejudice person who receives negative feedback, 
finding out that his peers disagree with him, should now have his negative affect exacerbated. Yet 
this exacerbation of negative affect causes him to move closer, not further away from the experi-
mental compatriot.
Mandelbaum thus takes disagreement to be a negatively valenced cue—the kind of cue 
that, following CB principles, has a negative influence on us. If associationism about im-
plicit attitudes is true, Mandelbaum argues, the already negative attitude toward African 
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Americans held by students in the high-biased group should get reinforced upon learning 
about their peers’ pronounced disagreement, so they end up sitting further away from the 
African American confederate. Yet, the behaviour of the high-prejudice person need not be 
explained by CB or dissonance theory principles acting over mental representations with 
a propositional structure. The effects of disagreement on the high-prejudice person could 
perfectly be the result of both adjustments within already held negative associations involv-
ing African Americans—with the disagreeing majority acting as an inhibiting element on 
an already activated association—and the regulatory action over these mental representa-
tions of an external factor subject to the principles of CB.
Social psychologists have known for a long time that all sorts of non-associative proc-
esses can influence subjects’ performance on tasks involving measures of implicit atti-
tudes. In particular, the so-called Quadruple Process Model (Sherman et al. 2008) alerts 
us to there being four different parameters behind the explanation of any performance on 
tasks of this kind. These parameters are: activation of associations, detection of correct re-
sponses, overcoming bias, and guessing. The presence (or absence) of preconscious goals has 
also been isolated as a non-associative, regulatory factor with similar functions (Moskowitz 
et al. 1999). Calanchini et al. (2014) apply this model to estimate the contribution of such 
processes to IAT performance in an effort to examine whether the influence is relatively 
general, i.e., not related to the content of the attitude to be measured, or attitude-specific. 
Of these four parameters, the most important for the purpose of this paper is the overcom-
ing bias parameter—which also includes the motivation to do so and the detection of con-
flict that this process generates. Overcoming bias is typically invoked to explain how acti-
vation of associations and detection of correct responses interact when in conflict. In such 
cases, overcoming bias is invoked as a regulatory, conflict-resolving process that prevents 
already activated associations from influencing biased behaviour (Calanchini et al. 2014, 
1286). A majority of peers disagreeing with you would naturally be taken to play exactly 
this role, namely the role of regulating the already established association between African 
American and a negative valence in light of what is taken to be (given the majority of disa-
greeing peers) the correct response.14
A closer look at the kind of evidence Mandelbaum examines thus undermines the link 
between logical / evidence sensitivity and propositional structure. If my argument here 
is sound, the fact that implicitly biased behaviour can sometimes be modulated by logi-
cal and evidential considerations (and not just by altering certain environmental contin-
gencies) does not settle the issue of the representational format of the implicit attitudes 
themselves. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations falls short of establishing 
14 Tools from the Quadruple Process Model can also be used to weaken Mandelbaum’s use of Briñol et 
al. (2009)’s results, which show argument quality to influence implicit attitudes. After presenting stu-
dents with strong and weak arguments in favour of hiring more African American professors at uni-
versities, they were given an IAT test. The tests revealed that students who listened to the strong ar-
guments showed more positive associations with black faces than those who were exposed to the weak 
arguments. Yet, these findings are, again, consistent with there being a regulatory role of non-associ-
ative factors over associations—especially the presence of the students’ motivation to overcome their 
bias. It is revealing, in this sense, that the students who listened to the strong arguments were also told 
that “the integration policy was being considered for implementation at their own (vs. a remote) uni-
versity and in the next academic year (vs. in 10 years)” (Briñol et al. 2009, 294).
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the propositional representational structure of implicit attitudes.15 We need to look else-
where in our search for criteria that help decide between a Doxastic and an Association-
ist view of implicit attitudes. The place to look for, I shall argue next, is the world of social 
structures and structural injustice. We pick up features repeatedly linked together within 
our social environment, and the specific way in which we pick up such features in the case 
of implicit attitudes makes it more plausible to think about them as associations. Or so I 
shall argue next.
3. Bringing implicit attitudes back to the social sphere
If changes in implicit attitudes, as measured by standard psychometric tools, are not a re-
liable indicator of changes in real world behaviour, and if the mechanisms responsible for 
such behaviour are in all likelihood quite complex and heterogeneous, how are we to settle 
the issue of the representational structure of the implicit attitudes themselves? Perhaps we 
can’t. Perhaps there is no conclusive way of determining the exact representational struc-
ture of these mental states (but see e.g. Huebner 2016). Perhaps, as Holroyd and Sweetman 
(2016) argue, there is no unitary cognitive phenomenon that falls under the concept of im-
plicit attitude. Yet, on the idealized assumption that implicit attitudes are indeed a specific 
type of representation, the question of which hypothesis about its representational struc-
ture best explains the available evidence concerning its fundamental qualities still makes 
perfect sense. It still makes sense to ask, following Lipton (2004), which explanation is “the 
loveliest explanation”—the explanation that provides the most understanding of the phe-
nomenon and is, for this reason, the likeliest explanation. The loveliest explanation of the 
representational structure of implicit attitudes is the explanation that best explains their 
central features. It would thus be a mistake—a methodological mistake with important con-
sequences—to focus on a property of the phenomenon that appears to be rather peripheral: 
modulation by evidence.
A hypothesis that focuses on the influence of logical and evidential considerations on 
modulating implicitly biased behaviour fosters (even if it is not necessarily committed to) 
the thought that we could, through reflective deliberation alone, bring about social and 
self-reform in the face of prejudiced environments. Such a hypothesis promotes the sort 
of individualism that Sally Haslanger (2015) so insightfully isolates as promoting the con-
cealment of structural elements of injustice and prejudice in our societies. It helps to shift 
the focus away from the most important property of the phenomenon: not just implicit at-
titudes’ resilience to change in the face of evidence. Implicit attitudes share this type of re-
silience with other mental states that deserve properly the label of beliefs.16 It helps to shift 
15 As I pointed out earlier (Section 0), my argument remains neutral as to the truth of a different condi-
tional, namely, that if implicit attitudes are insensitive to logical and evidential considerations, then 
they are associations. A version of this conditional, which focuses of the alleged insensitivity of implicit 
attitudes to logical form, is defended by Madva (2016). This is also the conditional guiding most re-
search in social psychology, especially anything involving Gawronski and collaborators.
16 Those who endorse a doxastic view of implicit attitudes do acknowledge resistance, but typically ex-
plain it by appealing to a fragmented mind: explicit and implicit attitudes would be, according to 
them, stored separately, with little or no connection between storage modules. I cannot address here 
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the focus away from a type of resilience to change in the face of evidence that reflects and 
contributes to social injustice. Such stubbornness seems to arise from (i) the frequent gap 
between our implicit and explicit attitudes, and, also, and importantly, from (ii) the fact 
that the reproduction of socially and morally unjust structures often makes us more effi-
cient epistemic agents. If we focus on these two uncontroversial properties of implicit at-
titudes, as they relate to their standard lack of malleability, the associative view becomes a 
much better hypothesis than the alternative doxastic view. I’ll briefly address these two is-
sues in turn.
About (i). Of course, our implicit and explicit attitudes may coincide. There are peo-
ple who are openly racist, sexist or homophobic. And, of course, implicit and explicit at-
titudes can be related—with the strength of the relationship varying with context and 
subject matter. But what makes implicit attitudes theoretically interesting—and morally 
and politically damaging—is that they are often at odds with our explicit beliefs in such 
a way that we do not endorse their truth. It is thus difficult to change what we do not 
think we hold true. Furthermore, this feature has an important consequence that speaks 
in favour of an associationist view: we cannot retract from implicit attitudes. We cannot 
take back what we do not endorse to begin with. It is not just that implicit attitudes are 
regulated irrespective of truth-supporting considerations. This is also the case with some 
of our both conscious and unconscious beliefs. It is rather that implicit attitudes do not 
seem to be in the business of representing facts—they are not the kind of mental state 
that is constitutively subject to a norm of truth (e.g. Shah & Velleman 2005) or a norm 
of knowledge (see e.g. Williamson 2000).17 They express, instead, an evaluative attitude 
toward their object.
About (ii). Indeed, implicit attitudes not only reflect entrenched social structures in 
which inequality and discrimination are pervasive, the fast and automatic ways in which 
they move us to act often grant us an epistemic advantage, especially under time con-
straints. We don’t just represent genuine (unjust) regularities in our social environment, 
these representations also contribute to the perpetuation of such prevailing unjust features 
by often granting us epistemic gains.18 Again, the presence of such epistemic benefits par-
tially explains why it is so difficult to change implicit attitudes through rational considera-
tions. At the same time, when what we want to explain is the very presence of such epis-
temic advantages, achieved in the face of our often contradictory explicitly held beliefs, a 
the advantages and disadvantages of the fragmentation hypothesis as it applies to implicit attitudes. It 
seems to me, however, that fragmentation falls short of properly addressing the distinctive social role 
of implicit attitudes in light of their also being epistemically efficient representational structures (see 
below). 
17 For those who endorse a norm of truth, the thesis is that subjects can be said to believe that p only if 
they implicitly accept a normative judgment whose content is to believe that p only if p is true (e.g. 
Shah & Velleman 2005). Williamson (2000) defends instead that belief is constitutively regulated by 
the knowledge norm, i.e., one must: believe p only if one knows p.
18 Gendler (2008b, 2011) is right in pointing out the difficult normative dilemma that this poses for us. 
The more we know about our social environment, the more likely it is that we act in biased and preju-
diced ways. So we have to either ignore genuine socially relevant regularities, thus incurring into epis-
temic costs, or we have to deploy extra cognitive energy in suppressing and controlling the readily avail-
able information that we get from our social environment. 
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view of implicit attitudes as associative structures offers a straightforward, lovelier explana-
tion than a doxastic view. Associationism allows us to draw a picture of the properties as-
sociated with a certain category such that even when not all them are properties that all its 
members possess, it is often epistemically advantageous to act as though they were. From an 
associative point of view, it is also easier to explain why we are capable of recognizing mem-
bers of a category based on incomplete or distorted information and also capable of general-
izing knowledge acquired about a certain category to members of a similar one. An associa-
tive view of implicit attitudes explains why it is so difficult to be both epistemically virtuous 
and epistemically efficient by characterizing them as evaluative structures with great devel-
opmental and evolutionary adaptability but little sensitivity to truth, hence their resilience 
to change through logical and evidential considerations.
Despite this resilience, implicit attitudes do change. Yet, when they do, it is usually 
through the acquisition of strategies to fight a biased social environment (see e.g. Devine 
et al. 2012)19 and, above all, through changes in the very social structures that cause the bi-
ases to begin with. A classic example is Dasgupta and Asgari (2004)’s field study compar-
ing the change in implicit attitudes with regard to gender and leadership of two groups of 
women after one year in college. The first group attended an all women’s college, where 
most faculty and administrators were women, and was hence exposed to lots of counter-
stereotypical female roles. The second group attended a co-educational school and was ex-
posed to a comparatively lower number of women in leadership positions. Implicit gender 
bias was hugely reduced in the women who attended the all-women’s college by their so-
phomore year; they were also faster at automatically associating women with counter-ster-
eotypical qualities regarding leadership. Implicit gender bias in the women who attended 
the co-educational college was, by contrast, much stronger after the first year. Interest-
ingly, neither group of women showed any change in their explicit beliefs about women 
vis-à-vis leadership. In both groups, women remain convinced that women were better 
carers than leaders.
This study illustrates how implicit attitudes’ underground sovereignty over our egali-
tarian views is the result of our getting tuned, in fast, automatic and appropriately sensi-
tive ways to prevailing features of our social environment and it is most efficiently changed 
through changes in such environment. I agree with Haslanger that the source of the prob-
lem with implicit attitudes is structural rather than individual, and that the analysis and 
the strategies to understand and fight against them cannot afford to ignore structural prop-
erties of our social environment.20 Even so, as Haslanger herself suggests, just focusing on 
structural social factors would not provide the whole picture either. When the task is to of-
fer the best possible explanation about the representational structure of implicit attitudes, 
the Associationist View seems better tuned to the anti-individualist approach Haslanger 
correctly demands. For associationism is wedded to the idea that changes in the thinking 
patterns that characterize implicit attitudes are mainly promoted by changes in experiential 
context, so that no change is likely in the absence of social change.
19 From a philosophical point of view, this is also the strategy suggested by Madva (2016). 
20 Advocates of the doxastic view may very well agree with this. The disagreement comes in when assess-
ing the impact of this social fact on the sort of considerations that lead to settle arguments about the 
representational format of implicit attitudes.
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I have tried to clarify what the representational structure of implicit attitudes might 
be in light of the available evidence and given how we use the ordinary concept of implicit 
attitudes. My theoretical toolbox is not rooted in the classic terms of conceptual analysis. 
Even so, if, following Haslanger (2006), we were to distinguish between descriptive and 
ameliorative projects in philosophy, my approach in this paper primarily responds to a de-
scriptive inquiry. Yet, if I am right that (i) occasional modulation by logical and rational 
considerations does not settle the issue of implicit attitudes’ representational structure and 
(ii) that viewing implicit attitudes as associations best explains the fact that implicit atti-
tudes change predominantly through changes in the social environment, then this associa-
tionist view also illustrates a scenario in which the descriptive and the ameliorative projects 
coincide. For such an associationist view also allows us to arrive at a concept of implicit 
attitudes that helps us to better pursue our goal of social justice by highlighting that it is 
largely, if not only, through changes in the social environment that we can modulate the 
pernicious influence of implicit attitudes in our lives.
REFERENCES
Bain, David. 2013. Pains that don’t hurt. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(2): 1-16.
Banaji, Mahzarin R. 2001. Implicit attitudes can be measured. In Henry L. Roediger, James S. Nairne, Ian 
Neath, and Aimée M. Suprenant, eds., The nature of remembering: Essays in Honor of Robert G. Crowder, 
117-149. Washington, DC: APA.
Bar-Anan, Yoav and Brian Nosek. 2014. A comparative investigation of seven indirect attitude measures. Be-
havioural Research 46: 668-688.
Beecher, Henry K. 1955. The powerful placebo. Journal of the American Medical Association 159(7): 1602-
1606.
Blair, Irene, Jennifer E. Ma and Alison P. Lenton. 2001. Imagining stereotypes away: the moderation of im-
plicit stereotypes through mental imagery. J. of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (5): 828-841.
Briñol, Pablo, Richard E. Petty and Michele J. McCaslin. 2009. Changing attitudes on implicit versus ex-
plicit measures: What is the difference? In R. Petty, R. Fazio, and P. Briñol, eds., Attitudes: Insights from 
the New Implicit Measures, 285-326. New York: Psychology Press.
Brownstein, Michael. 2016a. Implicit bias. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Zalta, E.N. (Ed.) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/implicit-bias/>.
—. 2016b. Implicit bias, context, and character. In Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul, eds., Implicit Bias 
and Philosophy. Volume II: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics Oxford: OUP.
Brownstein, Michael and Alex Madva. 2012. Ethical automaticity. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42(1): 67-
97.
Calanchini, Jimmy and Jeffrey W. Sherman. 2013. Implicit attitudes reflect associative, non-associative, and 
non-attitudinal processes. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 7/9: 645-667.
Calanchini, Jimmy, Jeffrey W. Sherman, Karl Christoph Klauer and Calvin K. Lai 2014. Attitudinal and 
non-attitudinal components of IAT performance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40(10): 
1285-1296.
Carlsson, Rickard and Jens Agerström. 2016. A closer look at the discrimination outcomes in the IAT litera-
ture. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 57: 278-287.
Dasgupta, Nilanjana and Shaki Asgari 2004. Seeing is believing. Exposure to counterstereotypical women 
leaders and its effect on the malleability of automatic gender stereotyping. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology 40(5): 642-658.
58 Josefa Toribio
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 41-60
De Houwer, Jan 2014. A propositional model of implicit evaluation. Social and Personality Psychology Com-
pass 8(7): 342-353.
Devine, Patricia G., Patrick S. Forscher, Anthony J. Austin and William T. L. Cox. 2012. Long-term reduc-
tion in implicit race bias: A prejudice habit-breaking intervention. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology 48: 1267-1278.
Egan, Andy. 2011. Comments on Gendler’s ‘The epistemic costs of implicit bias’. Philosophical Studies 156: 
65-79.
Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. and Keith E. Stanovich. 2013. Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advanc-
ing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science 8: 223-241.
Festinger, Leon 1957. A Theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Fireston, Chaz and Brian J. Scholl. 2016. Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for 
“top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X15000965, e229
Forscher, Patrick S., Calvin Lai, Jordan Axt, Charles R. Ebersole, Michelle Herman, Patricia G. Devine and 
Brian A. Nosek. 2016. A meta-analysis of change in implicit bias. Open Science Framework. December 
9. osf.io/awz2p.
Gawronski, Bertram and Fritz Strack. 2004. On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency: Disso-
nance changes implicit but not explicit attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40: 535-
542.
Gawronski, Bertram, Eva Walther, and Hartmut Blank. 2005. Cognitive consistency and the formation of 
interpersonal attitudes: Cognitive balance affects the encoding of social information. Journal of Experi-
mental Social Psychology 41, 618-626.
Gawronski, Bertram, Roland Deutsch, Sawsan Mbirkou, Beate Seibt and Fritz Strack. 2008. When “Just Say 
No” is not enough: Affirmation versus negation training and the reduction of automatic stereotype acti-
vation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44: 370-377.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. 2008a. Alief and belief. The Journal of Philosophy 105(10): 634-663.
—. 2008b. Alief in action (and reaction). Mind and Language 23(5): 552-585.
—. 2011. On the epistemic costs of implicit bias. Philosophical Studies 156: 33-63.
Greenwald, Anthony G., Debbie E. McGhee and Jordan L. K. Schwartz. 1998. Measuring individual differ-
ences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74: 
1464-1480.
Greenwald, Anthony G, Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji and Karl Christoph Klauer. 2005. Validity of 
the salience asymmetry interpretation of the IAT: Comment on Rothermund and Wentura. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 134(3): 420-425.
Greenwald, Anthony G., T. Andrew Poehlman, Eric Luis Uhlmann and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2009. Under-
standing and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 97: 17-41.
Greenwald, Anthony G., Mahzarin R. Banaji and Brian A. Nosek. 2015. Statistically small effects of the Im-
plicit Association Test can have societally large effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 108: 
553-561.
Haslanger, Sally. 2006. What good are our intuitions? Philosophical analysis and social kinds. Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Sup. Vol. 80(1): 89-118.
—. 2015. Social structure, narrative and explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(1): 1-15.
Heider, Fritz. 1958) The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley.
Holroyd, Jules 2012. Responsibility for implicit bias. Journal of Social Philosophy 43(3): 274-306.
Holroyd, Jules and Joseph Sweetman. 2016. The heterogeneity of implicit biases. In Michael Brownstein and 
Jennifer Saul, eds., Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: OUP.
Huebner, Bryce. 2016. Implicit bias, reinforcement learning, and scaffolded moral cognition. In Michael 
Brownstein and Jennifer Saul, eds., Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology. 
Oxford: OUP.
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 41-60
 Implicit Bias: From Social Structure to Representational Format 59
Hughes, Sean, Dermot Barnes-Holmes and Jan De Houwer. 2011. The dominance of associative theorizing 
in implicit attitude research: Propositional and behavioral alternatives. The Psychological Record 61(3): 
465-498.
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Karpinski, Andrew and James L. Hilton. 2001. Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 81: 774-788.
Katz, Irwin and Glen R. Hass. 1988. Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: correlational and prim-
ing studies of dual cognitive structures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 55(6): 893-905.
Kawakami, Kerry, John F. Dovidio, Jasper Moll, Sander Hermsen and Abby Russin. 2000. Just say no (to 
stereotyping): effects of training in the negation of stereotypic associations on stereotype activation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 871-888.
Levy, Neil. 2014. Neither fish nor fowl: implicit attitudes as patchy endorsements. Noûs 49(4): 800-823.
Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge.
Madva, Alex. 2012. The hidden mechanisms of prejudice: Implicit bias and interpersonal fluency. PhD disserta-
tion. Columbia University.
—. 2016. Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs. Synthese 193: 2659-2684.
Mandelbaum, Eric. 2013. Against alief. Philosophical Studies. 165:197-211.
—. 2016. Attitude, association, and inference: On the propositional structure of implicit bias. Noûs 50(3): 
629-658.
Marks, Joel. 1982. A Theory of Emotion. Philosophical Studies, 42: 227-242.
Martínez, Manolo. 2011. Imperative content and the painfulness of pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 10(1): 67-90.
Mitchell, Chris J., Jan De Houwer and Peter F. Lovibond. 2009. The propositional nature of human associa-
tive learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32(2): 183-198.
Nosek, Brian A. and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2001. The go/no-go association task. Social Cognition, 19(6): 625-
666.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Oakley, Justin. 1992. Morality and the Emotions, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Olson, Michael A. and Russell H. Fazio. 2004. Reducing the influence of extrapersonal associations on the 
Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 653-
667.
Ossipov, Michael H., Gregory O. Dussor and Frank Porreca 2010. Central modulation of pain. Journal of 
Clinical Investigation 120(11): 3779-3787.
Oswald, Frederick, Gregory Mitchell, Hart Blanton, and Philip E. Tetlock. 2013. Predicting ethnic and ra-
cial discrimination: a meta-analysis of IAT criterion studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
Studies 105(2): 171-192.
Payne, B. Keith, Clara Michelle Cheng, Olesya Govorun and Brandon D. Stewart. 2005. An inkblot for at-
titudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89: 
277-293.
Rothermund, Klaus and Dirk Wentura. 2004. Underlying processes in the Implicit Association Test: Disso-
ciating salience from associations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 133: 139-165.
Rozin, Paul and April E. Fallon. 1987. A perspective on disgust. Psychological Review 94(1): 23-41.
Sechrist, Gretchen and Charles Stangor. 2001. Perceived consensus influences intergroup behavior and stere-
otype v accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80 (4): 645-654.
Shah, Nishi and David J. Velleman. 2005. Doxastic deliberation. The Philosophical Review 114 (4): 497-
534.
Sherman, Jeffrey W., Bertram Gawronski, Karen Gonsalkorale, Kurt Hugenberg, Thomas J. Allen and Carla 
J. Groom. 2008. The self-regulation of automatic associations and behavioral impulses. Psychological Re-
view 115(2), 314-335.
60 Josefa Toribio
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 41-60
Sloman, Steven A. 1996. The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, (119): 3-22.
Smith, Angela M. 2005. Responsibility for attitudes: activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics 115(2): 236-
271.
—. 2012. Attributability, answerability, and accountability: In defense of a unified account. Ethics 122(3): 
575-589.
Williamson, Tim. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
JOSEFA TORIBIO is an ICREA Research Professor at the University of Barcelona. She previously held posi-
tions at the University of Sussex, Washington University in St. Louis, the University of Indiana, Bloom-
ington, and the University of Edinburgh. Her current research focuses on the analysis of central topics in 
the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, with a special emphasis on the philoso-
phy of perception and rationally responsive unconscious mental states such as implicit attitudes.
ADDRESS: ICREA, Pg. Lluís Companys 23, 08010 Barcelona, Spain. Universitat de Barcelona. Department 
of Philosophy, Montalegre 6, Barcelona 08001, Spain. E-mail: jtoribio@icrea.cat
